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Abstrat
The spillover eets of interonnetedness between nanial assets is deomposed into
both soures of shoks and whether they amplify or dampen volatility onditions in the
target market. We use historial deompositions to rearrange information from a VAR
whih inludes soures, diretion and signs of eets building on the unsigned foreast error
variane deomposition approah of Diebold and Ylmaz (2009). A spillover index based
on historial deompositions has simple asymptoti properties, permitting the derivation of
analytial standard errors of the index and its omponents. We apply the methodology to a
panel of CDS spreads of sovereigns and nanial institutions for the period 2003-2013 and
identify how these entities ontribute to global systemi risk.
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1 Introdution
Determining the ultimate soure of shoks in a omplex system of interating entities is a poliy-
making nirvana. If the soure(s) an be quikly identied with ertainty, then poliy an be
eetively aimed at nudging or alleviating desired or non-desired outomes. The agenda of
understanding the omplex interations in the eonomy is part of the expanding literature on
both eonomi and nanial networks; see for example, Aemoglu et al. (2012), Aemoglu et al.
(2015), Pesaran and Yang (2016), and Diebold and Ylmaz (2016).
A onept of interonnetedness, playing a key role in understanding nanial networks, is
elusive and requires more attention. To estimate network spillovers empirially the method of
Diebold and Ylmaz (2009), heneforth DY, for measuring the relative ontribution of shoks
from alternative soures spilling over to aet others is ommon in the literature. In this method
interonnetedness of the network is dened from a foreast error variane deomposition based
on a standard vetor auto-regression framework between endogenous variables (see Diebold and
Ylmaz (2014)). This approah has gained popularity, with the advantages of being easy to
implement and interpret, seemingly nie foreasting properties, simple extensions to varying
time horizons and appliable aross many dierent types of appliation; see for example Yilmaz
(2010), Alter and Beyer (2014) and the range of appliations presented in Diebold and Ylmaz
(2015) and Demirer et al. (2015).
This paper proposes a further development whih has the additional advantage of signing the on-
tribution of the soures of volatility into those whih augment observed volatility and those whih
dampen it. We do this by rearranging the information in the standard vetor auto-regression
to take advantage of the so-alled historial deomposition statistis. This deomposition fol-
lows from the VARMA form of the residuals in the VAR to attribute the estimated value of an
observation to its omponent shoks. Historial deompositions have been used previously in
the maroeonomi VAR literature, suh as Dungey and Pagan (2000), Sims (1992) but to our
knowledge have not been applied in the way proposed in this paper. The historial deompo-
sition approah to deomposing the soures of shoks and measuring interonnetedness does
not require normalization assumptions nor (neessarily) a hoie of window length to obtain a
time-varying spillover index as in DY method - although this an be aommodated if desired.
Assuming asymptoti normality the historial deomposition elements have additive properties
so that we an obtain not only the total historial deomposition spillover index from a parti-
ular soure to a given entity, but also ontributions of subsets of historial deompositions, and
ondene bands for both.
We provide further insight into the role of shoks that is not evident from unsigned deom-
positions. The appliation in this paper is to a set of 107 redit default swap (CDS) spreads
for as seletion of nanial institutions and sovereigns issuing 5 year debt denominated in US
dollars over the period 2003-2013. The results trak the time-varying ontribution of subsetors
of the data to overall spreads. For example, we show that the banking setor generally ats
to exaerbate spreads during the period of the global nanial risis. Finanial institutions are
the major reipients of "bad" shoks during the GFC and the European debt risis. Emerging
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and frontier markets are strongly interonneted, while the transmissions from these markets
to developed markets are relatively small. Global systemially important banks are the most
inuential entities using other banks as a ritial link in the ombined network. We also show
that higher order moments of the spillovers ontain diering information about the evolution of
the spillover index over time.
The remainder of the artile is organized as follows. Setion 2 introdues a novel interonneted-
ness measure whih takes into aount the shoks and whether these shoks amplify or dampen
volatility in the target market and provides asymptoti properties of this measure. Setion 3 out-
lines the dataset onsisting of daily CDS spreads for sovereign nations and nanial institutions.
Setion 4 disusses the empirial results. Setion 5 onludes.
2 Measuring interonnetedness from a historial deomposition
The methodology proposed here provides a new measure of interonnetedness by modifying
the Diebold and Ylmaz (2009) approah. By fousing on historial deompositions rather than
foreast error variane deompositions we provide the signs of ontributory shoks, adding in-
formation on whether transmissions augment or dampen the outomes in the target market.
2.1 Network of sovereigns and nanial institutions
Consider N entities indexed by i, N1 of these entities are nanial institutions whih lend for
projets with unertain returns as in Diamond (1982), and N2 are sovereign borrowers, where
N=N1+N2. The nanial institutions annot fund their lending ativities from their own balane
sheets and establish inter-institutional ows with eah other. Following Aemoglu et al. (2015)
eah nanial institution has the opportunity to invest in the real eonomy with an unertain
return r1,it in period t and/or invest in sovereign bonds with r2,it. Inorporating the extension
proposed by Dungey et al. (2017a), a sovereign bond return, r2,it, is also risky and the values of
returns r1,it and r2,it are inuened by an external shok, uit, whih is a random variable drawn
from a given distribution with mean zero and variane one.
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The joint probability distribution
p(u1t, ..., uNt) for N entities is assumed to be known. The liabilities between entities reates a
network, where the edges are determined by repayments required between pairs of entities.
Denition 1 Network G is the pair (N ,E), where N is a set of nodes representing entities
(banks or sovereigns), and a set of edges E represents ontrats between two entities from lender
to borrower.
Denition 2 A walk Pj1,jk is a sequene of entities (j1, ..., jk) suh that the pairs (j1, j2),
(j2, j3),...,(jk−1, jk) ∈ E are edges of the network. The length of the walk Pj1,jk is given by
1
Shok uit ontains unertainty about sovereigns and nanial institutions and an be seen as an aggregated
shok. However, it is trivial to separately analyze disaggregated shoks. Aemoglu et al. (2015) and Glasserman
and Young (2015) imply that shoks have a negative impat on returns. In this paper, the shok uit an have
either a positive and negative, or indeed insigniant, inuene on CDS spreads.
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the number of edges k ontained in it. The minimal length of the walk Pj1,jk orresponds to the
distane Dj1,jk .
A distane Dij , introdued in Denition 2, is a measure between two nodes i and j that an be
assessed for eah entity of a network. The network is haraterized by an N×N adjaeny matrix
A that ontains all information about the network. The adjaeny matrix A is a key ingredient
dening onnetedness of the network. To illustrate this idea suppose that the distane Dij is
assoiated with the length of the ontinuous funtion y = f(x) dened for any i and j. Then
the distane Dij an be dened by l subintervals eah of width ∆x. In this ase the distane
Dij an be approximated by a series of intervals Dk, k = 1, ..., l as
L ≈
l∑
k=1
|Dk−1 Dk|, (1)
whih is for large l equivalent to
L = lim
l→∞
l∑
k=1
|Dk−1 Dk|. (2)
Now applying the mean value theorem, the length L an be written as
L =
ˆ j
i
√
1 +
(
dy
dx
)2
dx. (3)
Equation (3) implies that the distane Dij , dening the adjaeny matrix A, is fully haraterized
by the derivative
(
dy
dx
)2
that should be alulated to obtain the onnetedness measure of the
network. This derivative an be estimated via foreast error variane deompositions, whih is
onsistent with the DY approah
2
.
We distinguish two types of onnetions from our historial deomposition approah: amplify-
ing or dampening. A positive weight represents an amplifying onnetion whereas a negative
weight represents an dampening onnetion.
3
Taking into aount that CDS spread pries re-
et a pereived risk of default, favorable news dereases the value of the CDS spread, while
unfavorable news inreases the value; thus positive weights Aij identify entities that inrease
systemi probability of default, while entities assoiated with negative values Aij redue the risk
of default in the network. This idea an be formally linked to equation (3) implying that the
weights assigned to edges of the network an take both positive and negative values. In this
instane a generalized length metri GL is dened as
GL =
ˆ j
i
sgn
(
dy
dx
)√
1 +
(
dy
dx
)2
dx, (4)
in whih sgn is a signum funtion.
2
An alternative approah, as in Billio et al. (2012) is to dene an adjaeny matrix A from Granger ausality
tests, in whih ase Aij = 1 if i and j are onneted, or Aij = 0 otherwise ∀i, j.
3
Jorion and Zhang (2007) emphasize the importane of positive and negative transfer eet in the CDS
market - they assign positive orrelations aross CDS spreads as ontagion eets, and negative orrelations as
ompetition eets.
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Denition 3 In a direted weighted network, eah node has two degrees. The out-degree δouti =∑N
j=1Aji is the number of outgoing edges emanating from a node i, and the in-degree δ
in
i =∑N
j=1Aij is the number of inoming edges to a node. The total degree of the node is dened as
δtot = δin + δout −Aii.
One an adjaeny matrix, A, is estimated, its degree distribution is the probability distribution
of degrees aross node, and the overall network onnetedness is dened as the mean of the degree
distribution (following Diebold and Ylmaz (2014)).
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This onnetedness measure failitates
understanding of the dampening and ampliation mehanisms of systemi risk in more detail.
For example, ‘robust-but-fragile' networks (see Haldane (2009); Aemoglu et al. (2015)) may
emerge in the fae of small unexpeted shoks to the systemati fator that auses losses for
many entities. The fragility of a network is haraterized by the total size of umulated small
negative shoks whih inrease network onnetedness, and the systemi default probability,
whih depends only on the absolute value of shoks. We permit elements of the adjaeny
matrix, Aij , to be negative and onsequently allow for dampening: a small negative shok
strongly aeting the entity with high systemi risk exposure an be oset by another positive
shok.
We use the approah to assess the time-variability of network onnetedness, whih requires
assessing higher moments of the degree distribution. Oh and Patton (2016) highlight the sig-
niane of modeling ovariation and oskewness in CDS spreads. In this paper the rst four
entral moments of the degree distribution are diretly evaluated from an adjaeny matrix A.
We onstrut the mean of the degree distribution, estimated ignoring signs of spillovers, whih
orresponds to the DY aggregate spillover index and onveys similar information. The variane,
skewness and kurtosis of signed spillovers may unover shifts in dierent phases of a risis. Suh
timing dierenes open an avenue for the onstrution of early warning measures of ontagion
and the propagation of systemi risk.
2.2 A weighted direted network of historial deompositions
We propose to measure onnetedness elements, Aij , from shares of historial deompositions
for various entities due to external shoks. The historial deomposition explains the fration of
variable i's variation at time t due to shoks in variable j. Following Diebold and Ylmaz (2014),
system wide onnetedness at time t is dened as a sum of all pairwise onnetedness measures
exluding self-loops in a network.
To take into onsideration the possibility of ommon stohasti trend(s) between the I(1) CDS
series, a Vetor Error Corretion Model (VECM) is used:
∆Yt = αβ
′
Yt−1 +
k−1∑
i=1
Γi∆Yt−i + εt, (5)
4
Alternative onnetedness measures suh as network diameter Dmax = maxi,jDij an be also used in these
settings.
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where Yt = [Y1,t,..., Yn,t]
′
, ∆Yt−i = Yt−i − Yt−i−1 and α, β,Γ are the parameters of the model.5
The rank of the matrix Π = αβ
′
is estimated by the Johansen test and imposing the triangular
restritions of Phillips (1991). The parameters of model (5) are obtained by applying OLS.
A VECM in (5) an be represented as a VAR(k)
Yt =
k∑
i=1
ΦiYt−i + εt, (6)
with ross-equation restritions Φ1 = αβ
′
+ Γ1 + In, and Φi = Γi − Γi−1, i = 2, 3, ..., k.
The redued form VAR(k) from equation (6) an be rewritten in terms of disturbanes and
initial onditions by applying the moving average representation as
Yt = initial values+
∞∑
i=0
Siεt−i, (7)
where Sj = Φ1Φj−1 +Φ2Sj−2 + ... for j = 1, 2, ... with S0 = IN and Sj = 0 for j < 0 and Sj are
ausal and square-summable. Any individual element Yj,t an be represented by ontributions
of all variables as
Yj,t = initial values+
t−1∑
i=0
S
(j)
i ε
(j)
t−i, (8)
whih represents the historial deomposition of variable j at time t. Ignoring initial onditions6,
equation (8) an be rewritten in a matrix form as
HDt+j =
∞∑
i=0
IRFi ◦Υt+j−i =
j−1∑
i=0
IRFi ◦Υt+j−i +
∞∑
i=j
IRFi ◦Υt+j−i, (9)
where ◦ is a Hadamard produt, Υt+j−i = [εt+j−i, ..., εt+j−i] is the n×n matrix ontaining resid-
uals, IRFi are non-orthogonalized one unit impulse response matries and HDt is a historial
deomposition matrix at time t. While other denitions of impulse responses inluding orthog-
onalized or generalized IRFs of Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) are possible,
they do not permit individual omponents of HDt to add up to Yt,∀t. This additive property
allows interpretation of the elements of historial deompositions HDt as shares of CDS spreads,
measured in basis points, ontributing to the total systemi default probability.
Another important impliation of equation (9) is that the historial deomposition HDt is a
funtion of impulse responses weighted by residuals εt, onsistent with the view that onnet-
edness is a weighted measure of shoks spreading through the network. Moreover, the historial
deomposition HDt ontains two dierent terms. The far right term represents the expetation
of Yt+j given information available at time t, whih is the base projetion of Y . The rst term
on the right-hand side shows the dierene between the atual series and the base projetion due
to innovations subsequent to period t. In partiular, it shows that the gap between an atual
series and its base projetion is the sum of the weighted ontributions of the innovations to the
5
A onstant term is suppressed for simpliity.
6
Initial values will be ignored in the forthoming empirial setions following Hualde and Robinson (2010),
with the onsequene that a rst part of the data do not provide empirially analytial deompositions.
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individual series. This reveals the dynami properties of the network as a system that evolves
over time by deviating from its long run state. Elements of the historial deomposition matrix
HDt,ij lay a foundation of onnetedness measures from j to i denoted by c
t
i←j . It is onvenient
to analyze a onnetedness matrix Ct = [HDt,ij ] where o-diagonal entries measures pairwise
direted onnetedness. In general cti←j 6= ctj←i as in- and out-degrees are not restrited to be
idential. This allows us to dene net pairwise diretional onnetedness as ctij = c
t
j←i − cti←j ,
whih is not restrited to be positive. Taking into aount that the sum of o-diagonal elements
of the j-th row of Ct gives the signed share of the historial deomposition oming from shoks
related to other variables, total diretional onnetedness from others to i is dened as
cti←others =
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
HDt,ij , (10)
and total diretional onnetedness from j to others as
ctothers←j =
n∑
i=1,j 6=i
HDt,ij . (11)
Furthermore, net total diretional onnetedness an be alulated for n variables as cti =
ctothers←i − cti←others, ∀t. To summarize pairwise diretional onnetedness for the sample T ,
we dene
cij =
1
T
T∑
t=1
HDt,ij ∀i 6= j, (12)
whih an be interpreted as a stati measure of onnetedness
7
between entities i and j.
The total of the o-diagonal entries in Ct denes the aggregate spillover index measuring total
ompleteness at time t as
HDSt =
1
n
(e′Cte− trae(Ct)). (13)
where e is the seletion vetor of ones.
2.3 Asymptoti properties of a signed spillover index
The main objetive now is to provide expressions for the asymptoti standard errors of the signed
spillover index. For this purpose suppose γ is a vetor of parameters and γˆ is an estimator suh
that √
T (γˆ − γ) d−→ N(0,Σγ), (14)
where
d−→ is assigned to onvergene in distribution and N(0,Σγ) denotes the multivariate normal
distribution. Let F (γ) = (F (γ1), ..., F (γm))
′
be a dierentiable funtion with values in m-
dimensional Eulidean spae and ∂Fi/∂γ
′
= (∂Fi/∂γj) is nonzero at γ for i = 1, ...,m. Then,
following Lütkepohl (1990),
√
T [F (γˆ)− F (γ)] d−→ N(0, ∂F
∂γ′
Σγ
∂F
′
∂γ
). (15)
7
Stati onnetedness an be also dened as an expetation of ctij over the whole sample.
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This general result provides the form of an asymptoti ovariane matrix for the signed spillover
index derived from the partial derivatives of F and the variane ovariane matrix Σγ .
Proposition 1 Suppose
√
T
[
ηˆ − η
σˆ − σ
]
d−→ N
(
0,
[
Ση 0
0 Σσ
])
.
Then √
T ve(ĤDi −HDi) d−→ N(0,ΨiΣηΨ′i), i = 1, 2, ...,
where
Ψi = ∂ve(HDi)/∂η
′
=
i−1∑
m=0
Ri−1−mGm,
in whih Gi =
∑i−1
m=0 J(Φ
′
)i−1−m ⊗ Sm, η = ve(Φ1, ...,Φk), σ = veh(Σε), J = [In 0...0], Ri is
the diagonal n2-variate matrix ontaining residuals ve(εi, ..., εi) on the main diagonal and
Φ =

Φ1 Φ2 . . . Φk−1 Φk
In 0 . . . 0 0
0 In 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . In 0
 .
Here ve denotes the olumn staking operator and veh is the orresponding operator that staks
only the elements on and below the diagonal and ⊗ is the Kroneker produt.
Proof: Appendix
Proposition 1 shows that an asymptoti variane-ovariane matrix of the historial deomposi-
tion HDi is haraterized by residuals, parameters of the model and one unit impulse responses.
Matrix Ση an be estimated as Ση = (ZZ
′
/T )−1 ⊗Σε, Zt = [Yt, ..., Yt−k+1]′ , Z = (Z0, ..., ZT−1)
for VAR models and as
Σcoη = T
[
Y−1Y
′
−1 Y−1∆X
′
∆XY
′
−1 ∆X∆X
′
]−1
⊗ Σcoε
for VECMs. In this ase Y−1 = [Y0, ..., YT−1] and ∆Xt−1 = [∆Yt−1, ...,∆Yt−k+1] and Σ
co
ε is
a variane-ovariane matrix from VECM (see e.g. Lütkepohl (2005)). In the forthoming
empirial study CDS spreads are I(1) series and for this reason the VAR with ross equation
restritions, dened in equation (6), is hosen as a benhmark model. The asymptoti varianes
from Proposition 1 do not go to zero, but onverge to the respetive long run values with
the sample size. An impliit onvenient assumption of equation (6) is that Yt has zero mean.
The results of Proposition 1 remain valid if a nonzero mean term, a polynomial or a seasonal
omponent is removed prior to estimating the VAR parameters. Equivalently, polynomial or
seasonal trends an be inluded in the model (6) and estimated jointly with other oeients
without aeting Proposition 1. This follows from the fat that the asymptoti varianes in
Proposition 1 only depend on parameters Φi and a variane-ovariane matrix Ση.
8
While Proposition 1 has been stated for individual historial deomposition oeient matries,
one an extend these results for the ase where the elements of ĤDi and ĤDj , i 6= j, are not
independent asymptotially. If elements of two or more HDi matries are inluded in the null
hypothesis the joint distribution of all the matries an be estimated using Proposition 1. In
partiular, the ovariane matrix of the joint asymptoti distribution of ve(ĤDi, ĤDj) is
∂ve(HDi,HDj)
∂η
′ Ση
∂ve(HDi,HDj)
′
∂η
,
in whih
∂ve(HDi,HDj)
∂η
′ =
[
∂ve(HDi)/∂η
′
∂ve(HDj)/∂η
′
]
.
Now the results of Proposition 1 an be used to obtain the asymptoti distribution of the
interonnetedness index based on historial deompositions.
Proposition 2 Suppose Qi = diag(ΨiΣηΨ
′
i/T ) is a vetor of parameter varianes and HDS
i
is
a spillover index dened from a historial deomposition in (13). Then
√
T (ĤDSi −HDSi) d−→ N(0, (e′Wie− trae(Wi))/n), i = 1, 2, ..., (16)
where Wi = unve(Qi) and operator unve is the inverse of the ve operator suh that Wi =
unve(ve(Wi)).
Proof: Appendix
Proposition 2 permits the estimation of the standard error of HDSi as a square root of variane
dened in (16). An important assumption for Proposition 2 is that a historial deomposition is
a unique transformation of data. Moreover, non-diagonal elements of a historial deomposition
matrix HDj are orthogonal by onstrution, whih allows us to obtain the ondene bounds for
the historial deomposition spillover index by taking average aross the non-diagonal elements
of Wi. A similar approah an not be applied to the DY spillover index as appropriate nor-
malization restritions that ensure foreast error variane omponents sum up to 1 are required.
These restritions make the derivation of the asymptoti distributions of variane deomposition
omponents diult. Thus, the asymptoti distribution of the DY index an not be obtained in
the usual way for setting up ondene intervals.
3 Data
Modeling the interonnetions between nanial institutions is hampered by data availability.
On the one hand, many of the theoretial frameworks are expressed in terms of inter-entity ows.
However, these data are exeedingly diult to obtain, partiularly outside the ommerially
available data sets; a good example is the UK interbank network in Giratis et al. (2016), who use
data available to the Bank of England. On the other hand, there is a strand of literature that
takes advantage of market-based data as proxies to develop an understanding of the interon-
netedness of networks, as in, for example, Billio et al. (2012) and Merton et al. (2013). Reent
9
work by van de Leur et al. (2017) nds that interonnetedness networks based on market data
produe valuable information that is not oered by alternative approahes. The work in this
paper draws on the market-based data tradition in this literature.
Table 1: Sovereigns inluded in CDS sample data. D-Developed, E-
Emerging, F-Frontier markets aording to the MSCI lassiation.
Europe Asia Latin Ameria
Bulgaria (F) Australia (D) Argentina (F)
Czeh Republi (E) China (E) Brazil (E)
Denmark (D) Indonesia (E) Chile (E)
Norway (D) Japan (D) Colombia (E)
Poland (E) Malaysia (E) Mexio (E)
Sweden (D) Philippines (E) Panama (F)
Russia (E) South Korea (E) Peru (E)
Turkey (E) Thailand (E) Venezuela (F)
Ukraine (F) Vietnam (F)
Afria Euro Zone North Ameria
Israel (D) Belgium (D) USA (D)
Moroo (F) Finland (D)
South Afria (E) Frane (D)
Qatar (F) Germany (D)
Ireland (D)
Italy (D)
Netherlands (D)
Portugal (D)
Spain (D)
The dataset onsists of daily ve-year CDS spreads for 40 sovereign nations and 67 nanial
institutions as listed in Tables 1 and 2. Five-year CDS ontrats are the most ommonly issued
and traded asset in this lass and are the most liquid (Dua and Peltonen (2013), Pan and
Singleton (2008), Kalbaskaa and Gatkowskib (2012)). The data are soured from Markit and
run for the period January 1, 2003 to November 21, 2013.
8
The sample has 107 nodes and
potentially 11342 (= 67!/65!) links.
The sample ontains three dierent phases; Phase 1 represents the non-risis period from January
1, 2003, to September 14, 2008. This is typial of dating onventions used in literature to separate
the pre-risis and risis periods; see the review of dates extant in the literature in Dungey et al.
(2015). Phase 2 represents the period from September 15, 2008, to Marh 31, 2010, onsistent
with the global nanial risis (GFC) and period following. The end of Marh 2010 represents
the period prior to whih the Greek debt risis beame ritial in April 2010. Phase 3, from
April 1, 2010, to November 21, 2013, represents the period of the Greek and European sovereign
debt rises. Summary statistis, reported in Table 3, show an inrease in spread means for
8
Our data nished in November 2013 for the initial drafts of this paper. On updating the dataset we found
that there were signiant hanges in later data due to the Dodd-Frank At and the implementation of the
so-alled Volker rule whih aeted new-issuane of US dollar denominated CDS for many of the institutions in
our sample.
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most groups of institutions and sovereigns, reeting the pereived inrease in risk during this
turbulent period in international debt markets. Skewness in Phases 2 and 3 are both lower than
in phase 1, exept Asia and Europe (phase 2), whih implies less asymmetry. Moreover, kurtosis
is muh higher before the GFC for most of the entities. Some of these results might reet
ations taken by the authorities that were more aggressive in the US than in Europe (see Borio
and Zabai (2016)).
CDS spreads were found to be non-stationary, I(1), with a maximum of one unit root aording
to KPSS and ADF tests.
Table 2: Finanial institutions grouped by broad type. SIB - Global Systemially Important Banks.
Banks Finanials Insurane
Aust & New Zld Bkg ACOM CO LTD ACE Ltd
Amern Express Co John Deere Cap Corp Aegon N.V.
Barlays Bk pl (SIB) MBIA In. Amerian Intl Gp In
BNP Paribas (SIB) Natl Rural Utils Coop Allstate Corp
Cap One Finl Corp Aiful Corp Aon Corp
Citigroup In (SIB) ORIX Corp Assiurazioni Generali
Ctrywde Home Lns Gen Ele Cap Corp CHUBB CORP
Kookmin Bk Goldman Sahs Gp In CNA Finl Corp
Commerzbank AG (SIB) Morgan Stanley Legal & Gen Gp PLC
Deutshe Bk AG (SIB) SEARS ROEBUCK MBIA Ins Corp
Hana Bank Toyota Mtr Cr Corp MetLife In
HSBC Bk pl (SIB) Swire Pa Ltd Munih Re
ING Bk N V (SIB) Old Mut pl
Korea Dev Bk Safeo Corp
Merrill Lynh & Co Mitsui Sumitomo Ins
Mizuho Corporate Bk (SIB) Sompo Japan Ins In
Maquarie Bk Ltd HARTFORD FIN INC
Natl Aust Bk Ltd Loews Corp
Oversea Chinese Bkg
Rabobank Nederland
Royal Bk of Sotland (SIB)
Resona Bk Ltd
Soiete Generale (SIB)
Std Chartered Bk (SIB)
Sumitomo Mitsui Bkg (SIB)
UBS AG (SIB)
Wells Fargo & Co (SIB)
Westpa Bkg Corp
Investment Real Estate
Daiwa Ses Gp EOP Oper Ltd Pship
Bombardier Hammerson PLC
Nomura Ses Hongkong Ld Co
Mitsubishi Estate Co
Simon Ppty Gp L P
Simon Ppty Gp In
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Table 3: Summary statistis are reported for all sovereign CDS spread data used in this paper. The
seleted phases are respetively onsistent with the pre-GFC, the GFC and the European debt risis.
Obs. Mean Std dev Skewness Kurtosis
Phase 1 01/01/2003 - 14/09/2008
Banks 1488 0.4253 0.6634 6.2252 73.1315
Finanials 1488 0.7426 1.4386 9.2843 131.738
Insurane 1488 0.5413 1.1174 10.551 146.240
Investment 1488 1.0126 1.6023 3.5076 19.9933
Real Estate 1488 0.5737 0.5135 2.5807 11.3350
Latin Ameria 1488 3.3274 5.0302 4.3823 24.8403
Asia 1488 1.0935 1.3470 1.4863 4.1704
Euro Zone 1488 0.0698 0.0759 2.8669 11.6775
Europe 1488 0.9062 1.5211 2.8717 13.9841
Afria 1488 0.8038 0.7205 2.5980 11.9358
North Ameria 1488 0.0262 0.0311 2.9249 11.0294
Phase 2 15/09/2008 - 31/03/2010
Banks 403 1.6490 1.2574 2.1977 8.4938
Finanials 403 12.719 32.619 6.6554 58.383
Insurane 403 3.6890 5.1029 2.4613 9.2081
Investment 403 1.9650 1.1711 1.0721 2.8133
Real Estate 403 2.6080 2.4492 1.4525 4.1223
Latin Ameria 403 6.3541 8.8135 2.2891 7.7371
Asia 403 2.0159 1.5864 1.7696 7.0876
Euro Zone 403 0.8250 0.5597 1.5966 6.8034
Europe 403 3.4588 6.4693 3.8884 20.298
Afria 403 1.9245 0.9750 1.3394 4.5551
North Ameria 404 0.4169 0.1834 1.1935 3.9374
Phase 3 01/04/2010 - 21/10/2013
Banks 951 1.3971 0.6334 1.6584 6.8687
Finanials 951 6.3933 10.211 2.0464 5.9045
Insurane 951 1.8314 2.1538 3.7857 20.033
Investment 951 1.4738 1.0772 0.5886 2.2274
Real Estate 951 1.1053 0.4586 0.6091 2.8172
Latin Ameria 951 3.7769 5.6733 3.1106 14.840
Asia 951 1.3284 0.7275 1.6687 6.1909
Euro Zone 951 2.5872 2.5487 1.9267 7.1373
Europe 951 1.6592 1.9220 2.2460 7.9880
Afria 951 1.4990 0.5059 0.5376 2.5000
North Ameria 951 0.3067 0.0801 -0.2616 2.3762
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4 Empirial results
4.1 Stati onnetedness
Figure 1 shows the average historial deomposition of the shoks ontributing to observed CDS
spreads for eah of the sovereign nations in the sample. That is, the vertial axis indiates the
reipient issuing ountry, and the horizontal axis gives the ontributing shoks measured as the
sample average of those shoks aross the historial deomposition. Lighter olours indiate a
positive transmission - that is the shok inreases the CDS spread in the reipient market. Darker
olours indiate a negative transmission - the shok dereases the CDS spread in the reipient
market. The table is primarily shaded approximately at average of zero reipient/transmission
shoks - on average the eets are largely anelled out over the sample.
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Figure 1: Heat map for sovereigns. Eets from olumns to rows represent averages of historial
deompositions over the whole sample. Dark olors show negative ontributions to CDS spreads,
bright olors - positive ontributions.
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It is ritial to dierentiate negative in-shoks from positive out-shoks in the gure - aross the
rows gives the soures and signs of in-shoks to the target listed in a partiular row; down the
olumns gives the eet of out-shoks soured from the ountry listed for that partiular olumn
to eah of the potential reipients listed down the olumn.
Reading aross rows the there are a few ountries whih show some variety in their soures of
shoks. Consider, the row labelled Argentina whih exhibits both amplifying and dampening
shoks soured from its partners. Shoks from Peru and Columbia are strongly negative, de-
reasing the CDS spreads for Argentina. However, shoks from Venezuela, Moroo and Turkey
on average inrease the CDS premium for Argentina. In a network framework eah of these
diretionally represents an in-shoks from the ontributing markets but they are signed as to
whether they amplify or dampen the eets of those shoks on Argentina. Other interesting
examples of markets whih display skew in their soures of shoks (aross the rows) are Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ukraine and Venezuela, that is they inlude members of the so-alled
GIIPS group, experiened ivil unrest or were loated in South Ameria.
Figure 2 shows the same heat map for the nanial institutions network. Reading aross rows it
is apparent that AIF, AIG, MBI, MBC and to some extent SHC reeive a diverse set of shoks.
9
Looking at the olumns for the soures of shoks, we an see that AIG, MBI and MBC are not
distintly dierent to other ompanies. These institutions are subjet to diverse shoks, but do
not emit shoks whih strongly impat in one way or the other.
Thus insurers are performing the role of absorbing and smoothing shoks oming from other
institutions and emitting shoks with little signed eet on other nanial institutions. From this
point of view these insurers are ating to stabilise the nanial system, rather than potentially
disrupt it. This result supports arguments that the role of insurers in they system is distint to
that of redit reating institutions; see Biggs and Rihardson (2014).
There are also two distintly dierent vertial lines in Figure 2; from BOM (Bombardier Capital
Inorporated) and SWI, a Hong Kong based onglomerate. Both of these rms are heavily in-
vested in the transport and asset naning setor. The result that transport nane is important
in spreading shoks is interestingly paralleled by the reent nding of Pesaran and Yang (2016)
that the transport and wharehousing setor of the US eonomy is routinely the most important
setor of the US eonomi network.
To illustrate how the distribution of shok eets hanges over the sample period, Figure 3
presents the histograms of the sizes of the shoks in eah of the three phases of the sample:
pre-GFC, GFC and European debt risis. The top panel shows the distribution of the shoks in
the nanial ompanies omponent of the network and the lower panel the distribution for the
sovereigns. In the pre-risis period, the mode of 0 is pronouned and tails are relatively small
for both panels. During the GFC and European debt rises we see that the distribution moves
to the right - that is there are more positive (amplifying) shoks present than pre-risis. The
distribution is more leptokurti, implying a greater proportion of larger signed shoks. These
9
MBI and MBC are the insurane and nanial arms of the same ompany (MBIA), and represent the largest
bond insurer in the market.The Aiful Corporation (AIF) is a Japanese nanial servies provider.
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hanging higher-order moments of our shoks are onsistent with the ndings in Fry et al. (2010)
that ontagion and risis are evident in higher-order moments of returns and volatilities.
AC
E
AC
O
AE
G
AI
F
AI
G
AL
L
AN
Z
AO
C
AS
S
AX
P
BA
C
BN
P
BO
M
C
  
C
B 
C
C
R
C
IT
C
M
Z
C
N
A
C
O
F
D
AI
D
B 
D
E 
EO
P
G
E 
G
S 
H
AM
H
AN
H
IG
H
KL
H
SB
IN
T
KD
B
LG
E
LT
R
M
BI
M
BC
M
ER
M
ET
M
IT
M
IZ
M
Q
B
M
U
N
M
W
D
N
AB
N
O
M
N
R
U
O
C
B
O
LD
O
R
I
R
AB
R
BO
R
ES
SA
F
SH
C
SO
C
SP
G
SP
G
ST
A
SU
M
SW
I
TA
I
TO
Y
U
BS
W
FC
W
ST
YA
S
ACE
ACO
AEG
AIF
AIG
ALL
ANZ
AOC
ASS
AXP
BAC
BNP
BOM
C  
CB 
CCR
CIT
CMZ
CNA
COF
DAI
DB 
DE 
EOP
GE 
GS 
HAM
HAN
HIG
HKL
HSB
INT
KDB
LGE
LTR
MBI
MBC
MER
MET
MIT
MIZ
MQB
MUN
MWD
NAB
NOM
NRU
OCB
OLD
ORI
RAB
RBO
RES
SAF
SHC
SOC
SPG
SPG
STA
SUM
SWI
TAI
TOY
UBS
WFC
WST
YAS
-10
-5
0
5
10
Figure 2: Heat map for nanial ompanies. Eets from olumns to rows represent averages
of historial deompositions over the whole sample. Dark olors show negative ontributions to
CDS spreads, bright olors - positive ontributions.
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Figure 3: Densities for 3 phases (pre-GFC, GFC and European debt risis). Dates of these
phases are presented in Table 3.
4.2 Dynami onnetedness
As well as the average eets disussed in the previous setion we also ompile spillover indies
based on the DY methodology (with 10 day ahead foreast period) and using the proposed
historial deomposition method. These are shown in Figure 4. The nature of the onstrution of
these indies means that the sales are quite dierent - the HD method has a diret interpretation
of the average size of the spillovers to CDS spreads from all soures in the system, and it an
be seen that this is typially quite small, and often insigniant in the early part of the analysis
via the 68% error ondene bands. The DY index has larger (always positive) values due
to normalization between 0 and 1 disussed in the previous setions. The DY spillover index
inreases dramatially in mid-2007, probably assoiated with the events of Bear-Stearns and
hedge funds in the middle of that year. The HD model piks up at that point, but piks up
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muh more substantially at a date loser to the stress assoiated with Lehman Bros ollapse and
the subsequent problems in the remainder of the system. Interestingly, the DY spillover index
does not fall dramatially with the introdution of TARP or the NBER dating of the ending
of the US reession as often used elsewhere in the literature (see Dungey et al. (2005) for a
review) but remains elevated. The DH index, however shows some redution in the eet of the
spillovers on CDS spreads post the GFC, but a resurgene of positive eets around the period
of unertainty surrounding the future of Greee in late 2009 - early 2010 and the re-emergene
of unertainty again around European debt markets in 2011 and 2012.
Figure 5 presents the HDS indies for the nanial institutions and the sovereigns separately
extrated from the ombined network. It is immediately apparent that the spillover eets
from the two soures have dramatially dierent time paths. Prior to the GFC from mid-2008,
nanial institutions were in fat behaving in a way whih redued the average CDS spread. Only
when the GFC beame well-established did the ontribution of nanial institutions peak, and
even then, the greatest ontributions were observed in 2009, rather than around the time of the
ollapse of Lehman Bros. The error bands shown in the diagram widen substantially around early
2010 when the Greek risis, subsequent IMF programs and European debt problems unfolded.
During the period from 2009 the ontribution to spillovers in the CDS markets from sovereigns
has been unerringly positive, and on average more than 4 times greater than during the GFC.
This pattern diers from Bostani and Yilmaz (2015) who found that onnetedness of the global
sovereign market by the end of 2013 returned bak to the same level as it was before the GFC.
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Diebold-Yilmaz spillover index
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Figure 4: DY and HDS indies estimated from equation (13) for 107 spreads. Shaded areas
represent 68% ondene intervals.
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Figure 5: HDS indies for nanial institutions and Sovereigns. Shaded areas represent 68%
ondene intervals.
4.3 Contributions by soure type
As the ontributions of eah of the soures of shok are additive in our approah we an ompile
sub-series whih illustrate the ontribution of partiular groupings on the spread. For eah of
the types of nanial institutions Figure 6 shows their HDS spillover indies as both reipients
of shoks (left hand panels) and as spreaders of shoks (right hand panels). It is useful to point
out that the sales for eah sub-gure dier, sometimes substantially.
10
The main result from Figure 6 is that the largest spreaders of shoks is the banks (top right
hand panel). Other spreaders have a substantially smaller impat on the rest of the system. As
reipients, however, the banks do not reeive a great deal of impat from others (top left hand
panel). With the exeption of the nanial institutions ategory all other types spread shoks
more than they reeive them. When reeiving shoks, eah of the left hand panels of Figure 6
shows that the shoks reeived amplied volatility (that is were positive eets) during the 2008-
2009 risis, although the ondene bands do not indiate signiane in all ases. However, in
the spreading of shoks, during the risis of 2008-2009 and through to 2010 it is very apparent that
eah ategory of institution had a dierent role. Banks were ontributing to dampening shoks in
the system prior to the GFC, but rapidly beame ampliers and have largely remained that way
sine. However, insurers had a dampening eet during 2009-2011, the period prior to the largest
10
Using the same sales is analytially intratable.
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disruptions in European markets. That is, the insurers were at this time reeiving amplifying
shoks and distributing dampening ones. The other partiularly interesting spreader ategory
is real industry (bottom right panel) where industry shoks were dampening shoks prior to the
GFC. During the build up to the GFC and its initial stages industry shoks were amplifying,
but this was reversed during late 2008, onsistent with the breaking of linkages between the real
eonomy and nanial setor noted in Dungey et al. (2017b) due to the introdution of TARP
and resue of AIG.
Figure 6: Interonnetedness between dierent groups of nanial institutions with 95% on-
dene intervals estimated from equation (16).
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Figure 7: Interonnetedness between dierent groups of nanial institutions with 95% on-
dene intervals estimated from equation (16). Eurozone is not presented as the respetive HDS
index is not informative and lose to zero.
Figure 7 represents the geographial inuenes of reeiving and spreading of shoks. Eah
panel represents the average eet of a shok from the spreading region to the reipient region
(this sales the shoks for omparison, given that there are, for example, many more issuers
in Europe than North Ameria for example). Europe is the reipient of the largest impat of
shoks, although these were experiened during the problems of the period of late 2008 during
the post-Lehman Bros turmoil, and during the remainder of the sample the eets from the rest
of the world markets were quite subdued
11
. The largest analytial dierene is that prior to
2009 the majority of the reeived shoks dampened European CDS spreads, whilst after 2009
11
Note that 80% of naning omes from banks in Europe and only 20% in the US, see Gambaorta et al.
(2014).
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they largely amplied them (although in neither ase are these eets statistially signiant).
The spreading of shoks from Europe shows a dierent piture, during the period prior to mid-
2010 Europe largely spread eets whih subdued CDS spreads elsewhere, that is they almed
pereptions of risk elsewhere. However, during the period of 2011 partiularly they ontributed
(insigniantly) to amplifying shoks.
The region whih spreads on average the largest ontributions is Asia, where during 2008-2009
Asia ontributed to the ampliation of spreads in CDS markets substantially, and signiantly.
For the majority of the rest of the period Asia mainly ontributed dampening eets on other
markets - although these were almost uniformly insigniant. In ontrast, Asia was not reipient
of a large dampening or amplifying eets from anywhere in the rest of markets - tying with
analysis that sees Asian markets as largely end-point nodes, or in a separated market, from other
markets.
Latin Amerian reeives relatively larger (insigniant) eets from the rest of the world, whih
as with Europe, were dampening prior to the 2008-09 risis, and with largest amplifying impat
during the risis period and then a redued eet thereafter. The prole is similar for Afria.
North Ameria, whih was at the entre of the GFC, and often regarded as the generating
market in the literature, reveals that as a reipient it sees very small eets from other regions
on its own CDS spreads. There is a slight period at the height of the turmoil around Lehman
Bros where the impat of transmission from other markets was statistially amplifying North
Amerian CDS premia, and evidene that thereafter that the average (insigniant) eet is
positive. In ontrast, the average eets spread from North Ameria are statistially signiant
and relatively large. Prior to 2008, the transmissions originating in the US had been dampening
CDS spreads sine mid-2005. The rst evidene of amplifying shoks ours in late 2007 and
early 2008 and from the third quarter of 2008 until approximately the period assoiated with
the end of the NBER dated reession in mid 2009 the eets of US originated shoks learly
amplify CDS premia elsewhere. A brief intermission of neutral to dampening shoks preedes
a further period of ampliation in 2010-2011 assoiated with the debt risis, before the US
transmissions beome a stabilizing fore from mid-2011 to mid-2012. This partiular example
learly demonstrates how muh inuene the US, as a entral world market has on the rest of
the world, and how learly the transmission hannels an hange in whether they amplify or
dampen the transmission of shoks. Clearly it is not suient to know whih markets are on
average amplifying or dampening spreaders to eah reipient, one needs also to keep trak of
these eets over time.
4.4 Developed vs emerging markets
We segment the results on spillovers by stage of market development using the IMF lassiation
of developed, emerging and frontier markets, see Table 1. The ontribution of shoks soured
from markets at dierent stages of development to the reipient markets are illustrated in Figure
8.
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Figure 8: HDS indies for developed and emerging markets with 95% ondene intervals esti-
mated from equation (16).
The transmissions to developed markets from emerging and frontier markets (the top panel of
Figure 8) are relatively small. Emerging markets were a net soure of dampening for developed
markets prior to the GFC, and have remained a soure of inreased premia sine, although
this peaked during late 2008. The eets from frontier markets on developed markets are more
onsistently positive, although less volatile. Emerging markets have reeived little inrease in
CDS premia as a result of shoks from developed markets
12
(in ontrast to the entre and
12
This nding is onsistent with Chen et al. (2016) who found that emerging markets beame eonomially
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periphery arguments of Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003), while shoks in frontier markets redued
CDS premia in emerging markets prior to 2009 for a period until 2012. In the other diretion,
however, frontier markets reeived substantial premium ampliation from developed markets
after 2009, and partiularly post the 2012 problems in European sovereign debt markets. Frontier
markets reeived more volatile eets from emerging markets - prior to 2009, emerging market
shoks were dampening frontier market spreads, possibly attrating investors to these markets
- but the risks were rapidly reassessed in late 2008, early 2009, and frontier markets suered a
dramati ampliation of shoks until early 2010.
Figure 9: Systemially important banks vs other banks and the rest of the world. A detailed
lassiation is presented in Table 2.
more resilient after the GFC.
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4.5 Global systemially important banks
Figure 9 provides spillover indies between banks whih have been designated as globally system-
ially important (SIBs), other banks and other types of nanial institutions. It is immediately
lear that the largest eets are apparent in shoks spreading from SIBS to Banks and other
types of institutions. The SIBs are learly an import soure of shok ampliation, onsistent
with the literature whih supports regulating banks for systemi risk reasons. However, the
inuene of shok ampliation from SIBS to other entities is not more signiant than ampli-
ation from other banks to other parts of the network. That is, while SIBs are important it is
not lear that to non-banks there is a huge distintion between SIBs and non-SIB institutions.
While SIBs were generally a soure of amplifying shoks from 2008 onwards, the non-bank se-
tor transmissions were dampening the transmissions to the banks. This may be an indiation
of the suessful appliation of poliy whih aimed to prevent redit restritions from reduing
eonomi ativity in the GFC period, but without a lear ounterfatual it is diult to be on-
lusive. The learest message from the SIB and non-SIB distintion is that SIBs have a larger
and more ertain amplifying eet on other banks than other banks do on SIBs.
4.6 Index distribution and moments
While the mean bilateral spillover, dened in (13), provides a summary of network ativity,
it may obsure a great deal of relevant information, partiularly if the degree distribution is
asymmetri and has signiant kurtosis. This information is partiularly valuable during the
risis when banks with greater upper tail dependene have higher CDS spreads (see e.g. Meine
et al. (2016)). A more omplete summary of spillover ativity must take aount not only of
the loation but also of the shape of the spillover density. For a given moment t, one may
approximate the empirial distribution of pairwise spillover eets via kernel density estimation
(see e.g. Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2017)).
Consider an h × 1 vetor of grids z = (z1, ..., zh)′, whih overs the range of pairwise spillovers
in matrix Ct. The density of pairwise spillovers is estimated from
gˆt(zk) =
1
bt
( 1
n(n− 1)
) n∑
i,j=1;i 6=j
K
(zk − ctij
bt
)
, k = 1, ..., h, (17)
where K is a kernel and bt is a bandwidth at time t. To ensure that gˆt(zk) integrates to unity
over the seleted range of grid points, the following standard normalization is employed as
fˆt(zk) =
gˆt(zk)
RIE
(
gˆt
) , (18)
where RIE
(
gˆt
)
denotes a numerial Riemann sum of gˆt = (gˆt(z1), ..., gˆt(zh))
′
. Following Silver-
man (1986), a Gaussian kernel with the rule-of-thumb bandwidth bt = 1.06τˆt(n(n − 1))−0.2, is
onsidered as a benhmark, where τt is the ross-setional standard deviation of c
t
ij . However,
given that the spillover density exhibits departure from normality when working with CDS data,
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right and left skew might be pronouned.
13
In this setion we ombine the information on pairwise onnetedness, Ct, with the Granger-
ausality approah to deteting network diretion and signiane of Billio et al. (2012) and
Merton et al. (2013). This approah redues the dimensionality of the problem, by removing
all non-Granger aused links. Billio et al. (2012) propose that Granger-ausality links have
an advantage over diret orrelation in providing a lead-lag dimension. Signiant Granger
ausality from entity i to entity s indiates that Yi has at least one signiant lag prediting
the value of Ys, indiating that the pereived risk of entity i defaulting predits the pereived
risk of default of entity s. The edges of the network onstruted from these Granger ausality
links represent preditors of eah node's pereived risk of default. Moreover, Granger ausality
established edges map learly to the existing empirial frameworks for measuring and testing
ontagion during nanial rises via the formation and breaking of linkages (the overarhing
framework for this is provided in Dungey et al. (2005)).
One a VAR form of the model is estimated from (6), Granger ausality between CDS spreads
Yi and Ys an be assessed using the Wald test
WT = [e · ηˆ]′ [e(V̂ ⊗ (Y ′Y )−1)e′ ]−1[e · ηˆ], (19)
in whih Y is the matrix of independent variables represented by CDS spreads, ηˆ denotes the
row vetorized oeients of VAR disussed earlier, V̂ = T−1
∑T
t=1 εˆtεˆ
′
t and e is the k×2(2k+1)
seletion matrix
e =

0 1 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 0 1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 0 . . . 1 0 . . . 0 0
 .
Eah row of e selets one of the oeients to set to zero under the non-ausal hypothesis
Yi → Ys.
The results of the Wald test indiating Granger ausality are reorded as binary entries in matrix
A˜ as
A˜ = [a˜is],
where
a˜is =
{
0, if Yi does not Granger ause Ys
1, if Yi Granger auses Ys
.
Matrix A˜ is used to onstrut the diretional edges between sovereigns and banks.
Given the estimates of the matrix A˜ and the spillover matrix C, the struture of the weighted
matrix an be haraterized as ˜˜
A = A˜ ◦ C,
where ◦ is the Hadamard produt. The elements of the adjaeny matrix ˜˜A now apture the
onnetedness between entities onditional on the signiant ausal linkages between them. The
13
An original DY spillover index often has a right skew and is bi-modal in some ases - requiring a areful
robustness hek inluding alternative kernels and bandwidths.
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network dened by the adjaeny matrix
˜˜
A shows the preditors of the risk of default subjet to
a shok aptured by the matrix C. Using the entries of the matrix
˜˜
A, system-wide ompleteness
is measured as
C˜ =
∑n
i,j=1
i6=j
˜˜aij∑n
i,j=1
i6=j
cij
. (20)
The index distribution onditional on the Granger aused linkages between entities is obtained
by applying equations (17) and (18) to the non-diagonal entries of the matrix
˜˜
A, ∀t.
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Figure 10: Moments of the spillover density obtained from equations (17) and (18). Blak line
- all 107, red - nanial institutions, green - sovereigns.
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The rst four moments of the HD spillover index estimates onditional on the Granger aused
linkages for all 107 nodes are shown in Figure 10, with the moments for the nanial ompanies
and sovereigns indies given separately as the red and green lines respetively. Three things
are immediately apparent. First, both skewness and kurtosis of the ombined and nanial
institution networks are positive and o-move during the GFC, whih implies signiant default
risk premia in the nanial industry. An interesting pattern in the skewness of these networks is
observed on the rst day of the GFC (15th of September 2008) when the third moment jumped
up by more than 5 basis points. This nding is onsistent with Fry et al. (2010) who argue that
higher moments are informative in prediting ontagion. Seond, the spillover variane for all
three networks inreases aross the sample. Moreover, there is a distintly observable shift from
pre-2008 to post-2008 in the level and volatility of eah of the indies. Third, while before and
during the GFC volatility of the ombined network is mainly driven by nanial institutions
- after the European debt risis of 2010 the variane of the ombined network emanates from
both nanial institutions and sovereigns. Overall, the sovereigns an be distinguished from the
nanial institutions in that the inrease in variane, skewness and kurtosis omes later in the
sample, loser to the problems assoiated with the Greek and subsequent European sovereign
debt risis.
To summarize the evolution of the whole degree distribution for eah time t we onstrut a
sequene of t = 1, ..., T spillover densities. The pre-risis period is onsidered as a benhmark
haraterized by a density fnc, whih is ompared with fcr, a density during a risis. Using the
following ommon divergene riteria, an evolution of the spillover density from a non-risis to
a risis phase an be assessed as
DH(fˆcr, fnc) = supz|fˆcr − fnc|/supzfnc(z), (21)
DM(fˆcr, fnc) =
ˆ
|fˆcr(z)dz − fnc(z)|dz, (22)
where fˆcr is the estimated density during the risis, DH is the Hilbert norm and DM is the
distribution mass dierene. Eah of these quantities is non-negative and takes the value zero
if fˆcr = fnc. Moreover, DM ∈ [0, 2], with DM = 2 when fˆcr and fnc do not overlap at all over
the seleted range of grid points.
Using the same spillover densities for the ombined network as in Figure 10, we estimate DH
and DM quantities for eah day t. A non-risis density fnc is obtained from the historial
deomposition spillovers in Deember 2004. As follows from Figure 11 both DH and DM
measures show similar patterns, namely between 2005 and 2007 the dierene between the risis
and non-risis spillover distributions inreases and ahieves its peak in July 2011. This peak
onurs with the beginning of the seond eonomi adjustment programme when Euro area
leaders agreed to extend Greek (as well as Irish and Portuguese) loan repayment periods from 7
years to a minimum of 15 years and to ut interest rates to 3.5%. After July 2011 the divergene
stays at the same level a sign of a deep risis in the nanial and sovereign CDS markets,
onrming the results of Oh and Patton (2016) that the joint probability of distress (a measure
of systemi risk) is substantially higher after 2011 than in the pre-risis period. This nding is
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also onsistent with the pattern of inreasing variane from Figure 10, whih allows to onsider
volatility in the CDS market as the main soure of systemi risk. Overall, the analysis of the
spillover density aross a range of moments permits a deeper understanding of the hanging
interonnetedness of the global CDS market.
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Figure 11: Hilbert norm and Distribution mass dierene estimated from equations (21) and
(22) respetively for all entities.
5 Conlusion
This paper has shown how an alternative deomposition of the information available in a VAR
representation of the strength of network linkages between markets an provide information on
soures, diretion and whether links amplify or dampen the transmission of shoks aross a
network. We show how the work relates to the popular (unsigned) Diebold and Yilmaz spillover
index, and the extra information whih an be obtained by knowing not only the soure, diretion
and relative size of shoks, but also the sign (amplifying or dampening) of their impat. We
emphasise that this is a dierent nding from diretion. The diretion of a shok indiates the
ow of a ausal event in one node to the other node. The ontribution of signing indiates
whether that transmission has a positive or negative impat on the volatility of the target node.
This is important for poliymakers as not all transmissions neessarily inrease volatility, and it
may be advantageous during periods of stress to be able to identify and target hannels whih
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exaerbate onditions whilst allowing those whih alm them to remain. An example of where
these mehanisms are debated in the literature onerns the role of short-sales restritions.
The proposed interonnetedness measure based on historial deompositions is easy to imple-
ment sine it does not require a rolling window estimation or any normalization sheme (although
these an be imposed if desired). The distribution of our index is asymptotially normal. The
orthogonality of elements of historial deompositions permits us to obtain analytial standard
errors of the proposed index.
Our empirial ndings onrm that both sovereigns and nanial institutions signiantly on-
tribute to systemi risks of the global CDS market. During the GFC both sovereigns and nanial
institutions indued high onnetedness assoiated with positive variations in CDS spreads, while
after the European debt risis high spreads were also present for sovereign issuers. Banks are
found to be the largest spreaders of shoks, while nanial institutions mainly reeive systemi
risk from others. Developed and emerging ountries spread a signiant amount of risk whih
was absorbed by frontier markets. Systemially important global banks used onnetions with
other banks as a ritial link in the ombined network.
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Appendix A: Asymptoti distribution for the spillover index based on historial
deompositions
The following result from Lütkepohl (1990) is used to prove propositions 1 and 2:
(i) Let γ be a vetor of parameters and γˆ be its estimate. Then
√
T (γˆ − γ) d−→ N(0,Σγ), (23)
where T is the sample size. Let F (γ) = (F (γ1), ..., F (γm))
′
be a vetor-valued ontinuously
dierentiable funtion with ∂Fi/∂γ
′
= (∂Fi/∂γj) 6= 0 at γ. Then
√
T [F (γˆ)− F (γ)] d−→ N(0, ∂F
∂γ
′ Σγ
∂F
′
∂γ
). (24)
The partial derivative of the historial deompositions HDi are omputed as
Ψi =
∂ve(HDi)
∂η
′ =
∂ve(
∑i−1
m=0Υi−m−1 ◦ IRFm)
∂η
′
=
i−1∑
m=0
∂ve(Υi−m−1 ◦ IRFm)
∂η′
=
i−1∑
m=0
DIAG(Υi−m−1)
∂ve(IRFm)
∂η′
(25)
=
i−1∑
m=0
DIAG(Υi−m−1)Gm , (26)
where DIAG(Υi−m−1) denotes the diagonal matrix displaying the elements of ve(Υi−m−1) along
its diagonal. A derivation of Gm is presented by Lütkepohl (1990). To obtain equations (25)
and (26) the following results from Magnus and Neudeker (1985) are used:
∂ve(Υ ◦ IRF )
∂η
′ = DIAG(IRF )
∂ve(Υ)
∂η
′ +DIAG(Υ)
∂ve(IRF )
∂η
′ . (27)
The rst term of equation (27) vanishes asymptotially as Υ goes to zero due to E(εt) = 0. This
proves Proposition 1.
For proving Proposition 2 notie that elements of a historial deomposition matrix HDi are
orthogonal by onstrution and for this reason the elements of this matrix are independent
normal random variables. Consequently equation (13) an be used to obtain an asymptoti
ovariane matrix of HDSi. In partiular, for i = 1, 2, ..., standard errors are omputed as
diag(ΨiΣηΨ
′
i/T )
1/2,
whih proves Proposition 2.
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